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RICHARD B. BULLOCK,
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ALAN W. DEARDEN; J. VANCE BEATTY;
FAYE B. BEATTY; THE ESTATE OF
REED A. BULLOCK, deceased; THE
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF
REED A. BULLOCK, deceased;
CLEO H. BULLOCK, individually,
and DOES 1 through 50 inclusive,

Case No. 970582-CA

Defendants and Appellees.
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES STATE OF UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, EUGENE H. FINDLAY,
CRAIG ZWICK, P. K. MOHANTY, DEAN W. HOLBROOK,
AND ALAN W. DEARDEN
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiff, a general partner of a limited partnership that
sold real property to defendant Utah Department of
Transportation, brings this appeal from two orders of the Third
Judicial District Court, the first dismissing with prejudice
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claims against the Utah Department of Transportation, Eugene H.
Findlay, Craig Zwick, P. K. Mohanty, Dean W. Holbrook, and Alan
W. Dearden (the State defendants) (Addendum, attached:

R. 337-

40), and the second granting summary judgment for the remaining
individual defendants (Brief of Appellees Beatty and Bullock at
Addendum 2:

R. 348-52) .

Jurisdiction lies within this Court

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (j) (1996), as the case
was poured over from the Supreme Court of Utah by order dated
September 23, 1997.

ISSUE PRESENTED UPON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Plaintiff's sole appellate claim with respect to the State
defendants is that the trial court erred m

holding that his

sixth through eighth causes of action are not contract actions
but actions regarding real property, governed by Utah Code Ann
§ 63-30-6 (1993) (see Brief of Appellant at 1 ) . Plaintiff raised
the issue in his memorandum (R. 271-73) opposing the State
defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint against them for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction \R

142-44).

The district court

granted defendants' motion in its entirety by order dated April
2, 1997 (R

337-40), specifically treating the challenged causes

as actions involving property ana holding them time-barred under
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (R. 338).
Standard of Review-

An appellate court "review[s] for

correction of error a trial court's order on a motion to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction."

Schwenke v. Smith, 942

P.2d 335, 336 (Utah 1997).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
All relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes,
and rules pertinent to the issue before the Court for decision is
contained in the body of this brief.
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition
Below
Plaintiff, a California resident and general partner of

Bullock Sc Beatty Associates, a limited partnership (R. 4, f 15),
filed this action on March 1, 1996 (R. 1-109).

In ten causes of

action, he alleged that defendants had violated his statutory and
partnership rights by completing the sale of partnership property
to the Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) without his
written assent.

Nearly two years earlier, he had filed suit on

the same claims against the same defendants in federal district
court (R. 147, f 6 and the exhibit cited therein).

The federal

court dismissed the case as to the State defendants on the basis
of Eleventh Amendment immunity (R. 14 7, %% 7-8 and the exhibits
cited therein).

In the present case the State defendants,

acknowledging that Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1996) gave
plaintiff one year from the date of the federal dismissal to
commence a new action, moved to dismiss the complaint, filed more
than three months after the one-year deadline, as time-barred (R.
142-50) . The state district court granted the motion by order of
April 2, 1997 (R. 337-40) .

Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal

from this order on May 2, 1997 (R. 346-47), following
announcement of summary judgment in favor of the remaining
defendants on April 3, 1997 (R. 341-45).

After the summary

judgment was reduced to a written order on May 7, 1997 (R. 34852), he filed a separate notice of appeal on June 3, 1997 as to
the private defendants (R. 355-56) . Mistakenly forwarded to this
3

Court, the appeal was transferred to tne Supreme Court of Utah
under Utah R. App. P. 44 (R, 360-61), which returned it to this
Court for disposition under its pour-over jurisdiction pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1996).
B.

Statement of Relevant Facts
At the time the cause of action arose, plaintiff, a

California resident, was one of four general partners of the
limited partnership Bullock & Beatty Associates; two of the other
general partners were defendants Reed A. Bullock and J. Vance
Beatty (R. 4, %% 15-16).

The partnership owned real property in

Provo Canyon (R. 6, H 23) that UDOT sought to acquire.

On

October 25, 1991, UDOT made the partnership an offer to purchase
the property for $510,000.00 (Brief of Appellees Beatty and
Bullock at Addendum 5:

R. 43-44) . A contract of sale carrying

the same date was signed for the partnership by general partners
Reed A. Bullock and J. Vance Beatty (id. at Addendum 5:
defendant Beatty also signed (K

42

R. 42);

as attorney-in-fact for

Marie B. Bullock (R. 40-41), a limited partner (R. 5, H 18).
Plaintiff allegedly was nor .nfcrmed of ami did not consent
to the sale before the contract was signed and delivered to UDOT
(R, 9, H 30; R. 97). On January 13, 1992, he wrote to defendant
Dearden, expressing hope that the sale could be consummated but
indicating his belief that his signature on the contract was
required (R. 47-49).

In the letter ne referred to a January 2,

1992 telephone conversation with Mr. Dearden in which he had
raised the same concern (R. 47).
4

On March 4, 1992, Reed A. Bullock, J. Vance Beatty, and
Marie B. Bullock, on behalf of the partnership, signed several
deeds transferring ownership of the property to UDOT (R. 12,
1 36; R.. 58-71) . On March 24, 1992, UDOT issued payment in the
amount of $510,000.00 to the partnership (R. 14-15, f 41). On
September 10, 1992, the partnership sent plaintiff a check in the
amount of $67,198.43 for his share of proceeds from the sale,
with a note explaining the distribution of the UDOT payment (R.
285).

Plaintiff endorsed and negotiated the check (R. 286). His

federal and state lawsuits, attacking the contract's validity,
ensued.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
When a court dismisses a timely cause of action without
adjudicating the merits and the time for commencing suit has
lapsed, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1996) provides a one-year
window for commencement of a new action.

Although the non-merits

dismissal of plaintiff's federal suit entitled him to this oneyear "grace period," plaintiff did not bring the action at bar
until more than fifteen months after his federal suit was
dismissed--over three months after the one-year window expire 1.
To avoid dismissal of the present case, plaintiff argues that his
complaint was timely because it is based on a written contract
and thus governed by the six-year statute of limitations for
contract actions found in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23(2) (1996).
This argument disregards the fact that none of his claims against
5

the State defendants is based on the contractual rights and
obligations of UDOT and the partnership, the contracting parties.
It further ignores that plaintiff, neither a party to the
contract nor an intended third party beneficiary, lacks standing
to sue on the contract.

Plaintiff's claims, sounding in tort,

are untimely under deadlines imposed by the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act, even as enlarged by section 78-12-40's one-year
window.

Moreover, plaintiff has waived any argument based on

third party beneficiary status by not raising it below, and the
issue is insufficiently briefed for consideration on appeal.
Finally, even if the contract claims were otherwise proper, they
cannot go forward against the individual State defendants because
the waiver of immunity under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-5 (1993) for
actions based on contract rights and obligations applies only to
governmental entities, not to individual employees.
Public policy supports this result,

The purpose of a

contract is to define the relationship between the contracting
parties, enhancing stability and predictability in the parties'
course of dealing.

Contract terms that specify procedures for

notice and commencement of suit over contract disputes help to
clarify that relationship and to make the course of dispute
resolution predictable.

Imposing external procedural constraints

on enforcement of negotiated rights and obligations may thwart
the parties' intent and deprive them of the benefit of their
bargain.

Section 63-30-5's exemption responds to this concern.

However, because a contract does not bind those, such as
6

plaintiff, who are not parties to it, their claims must be
governed by alternative means.

The statutory notice and

commencement requirements for non-contractual claims under the
immunity act serve this purpose.
Neither the relaxed rules of notice pleading nor amendment
of the pleadings to conform to the evidence can assist plaintiff.
The record does not contain evidence that can support plaintiff's
contract claims, and defendants have never argued that they had
insufficient notice of these issues.

Amendment and notice

pleading may save plaintiff from maladroit language but cannot
supply the missing elements of his legal theory.
For these reasons, the State defendants urge the Court to
affirm the lower court's dismissal of the case against them.

ARGUMENT
I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORPECTLY HELD PLAINTIFF'S
SIXTH, SEVENTH, AND EIGHTH CAUSES OF ACTION TIME-BARRED
AS ACTIONS REGARDING PROPERTY.
Plaintiff's sixth, seventh, and eighth causes of action
against the State defendants were dismissed on the sole ground of
his failure to meet the statute of limitations imposed by Utah
Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1996), which provides a window for filing a
new action after a timely prior suit is dismissed without
adjudication of the merits:
If any action is commenced within due time and a
judgment thereon for the plaintiff is reversed, or if
the plaintiff fails in such action or upon a cause of
action otherwise than upon the merits, and the time
limited either by law or contract for commencing the
same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or if he dies
7

and the cause of action survives, his representatives,
may commence a new action within one year after the
reversal or failure.
Plaintiff commenced the present suit more than fifteen months
after the dismissal of his federal suit on Eleventh Amendment
grounds and well after the time to file suit under the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act had expired.

Therefore, plaintiff's

claims against the State defendants can be considered timely only
if they are somehow exempt from the immunity act's procedures for
notice of claim and commencement of suit.

Plaintiff conceded

below that section 78-12-40 does not save his eighth cause of
action, seeking quiet title to the partnership property (see R.
411-12), as Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-6 (1993), which explicitly
controls quiet title actions, contains no exemption from these
procedural requirements (see Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-12 (1993)
and -15 (1993)) and is therefore subject to the one-year window.
Nonetheless, on appeal he advances the argument that this claim,
as well as his sixth and seventh causes of action--for,
respectively, rescission of the contract of sale and a legal
declaration of his rights in the transferred property--should not
have been dismissed as untimely.

He premises the argument on his

characterization of all three claims as arising out of
contractual rights or obligations under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-5
(1993), which expressly exempts contract actions from the notice
and commencement requirements as follows:

"Immunity from suit of

all governmental entities is waived as to any contractual
obligation.

Actions arising out of contractual rights or
8

obligations shall not be subject to the requirements of Sections
63-30-11, 63-30-12, 63-30-13, 63-30-14, 63-30-15, or 63-30-19"
(governing the requisites of notice of claim, commencement, and
undertaking).

Appellant contends that if the challenged causes

of action arise out of contractual rights and obligations, they
are governed by the six-year statute of limitations contained in
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23(2) (1996) for actions "upon any
contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an instrument in
writing"

(with exceptions not relevant here) and are

consequently timely.1
'The complaint's sixth cause of action seeks rescission of
the contract, the seventh seeks declaratory relief, and the
eighth seeks quiet title, all of which are arguably equitable
remedies. However, it is well settled that equitable relief is
appropriate only where legal remedies, such as damages, are
inadequate. See, e.g., Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P,2d
1034, 1040 (Utah 1995) (holding that " [t]he right to an equitable
remedy is an exceptional one, and absent statutory mandate,
equitable relief should be granted only when a court determines
that damages are inadequate and that equitable relief will result
in more perfect and complete justice"); see also Delivery Serv.
and Transfer Co. v. Heiner Equip. & Supply Co., 635 P.2d 21, 21
(Utah 1981) (holding that equitable remedy "is normally only
granted when damages may not accurately be ascertained or would
not adequately compensate the plaintiff"); accord Erisman v.
Overman, 11 Utah 2d 258, 262-63, 358 P.2d 85, 88 (1961);
Coalville City v. Lundgren, 930 P.2d 1206, 1210 (Utah App. 1997).
In the present case, Bullock has not argued, much less shown,
that the damages remedy he seeks is inadequate. Moreover,
Eullock never raised the issue of whether equitable claims ai .
subject to governmental immunity in response to the State
defendants' motion to dismiss below and, therefore, could not
raise it now for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., Bundy v.
Century Equip. Co., 692 P.2d 754, 758 (Utah 1984) (noting that
matters neither raised in the pleadings nor placed at issue
before the trial court cannot be considered for the first time on
appeal). In any event, since Bullock himself admits that his
complaint against the State defendants is seeking monetary
damages (see Aplt.'s Memorandum in Opposition to Sua Sponte
Motion for Summary Disposition at 2, H i ) , the State defendants'
motion to dismiss based on governmental immunity is appropriate.
9

Plaintiff's argument is not well taken.

The limited scope

of section 63-30-5's exemption does not reach his claims.

Under

the contract (R. 42), the partnership was obligated, in return
for the right to a cash payment of $510,000.00, to deliver deed
to the property at issue to defendant Dearden in escrow for UDOT
and to pay all 1991 property taxes assessed against the parcel;
UDOT was obligated to pay the partnership $510,000.00 in exchange
for a right to ownership of the property.

Plaintiff did not

allege that these contract rights and obligations were breached;
to the contrary, he alleged that their fulfillment violated his
rights under statute, under the partnership agreement, and
through conspiracy and fraud.

These claims are wholly collateral

to the rights and obligations of the contracting parties, UDOT
and the partnership.2

Because they involve matters wholly

2

Plaintiff erroneously declares that " [t]he State Defendants
entered into a contract for the purchase of real property in
Provo Canyon with the Individual Defendants who, without
authority, acted for the limited partnership" (Brief of Appellant
at 8 ) . This statement misrepresents the transaction, which was
between UDOT and the partnership entity not the individual
defendants. Both the offer (R 43-44 and the contract (R 42)
identify Bullock & Beatty Associates as the property owner,
contracting party, and grantor
Plaintiff failed to provide any
contrary evidence in the court below; in fact, his complaint
specifically states that at all relevant times, the partnership
"owned, and held all of the right, title, and interest in and to"
the property in question (R. 6, % 23). While plaintiff may have
a cause of action against the partnership for violation of his
rights as a partner, he has articulated no basis for individual
standing to sue UDOT on the contract itself, to which he was not
individually a party. See Kemp v. Murray, 680 P.2d 758, 760
(Utah 1984) ("Unless plaintiff could show that he suffered direct
injury personally, as distinguished from injury to the
partnership, this complaint was properly dismissed") . The Kemp
court further rejected the plaintiff's attempt to sue only on his
portion of the partnership claim, stating that " [a]llowing
plaintiff to go forward individually could subject defendants to
10

outside the contract rights and obligations, plaintiff cannot
escape the lapsed statute of limitations by invoking section
63-30-5.
Precedent supports this outcome.

The essence of plaintiff's

complaint against the State defendants is that they are holding
his property without right.

The supreme court has previously

indicated that such claims are properly cognizable under Utah
Code Ann. § 63-30-6.

In Hansen v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 838

(Utah 1990), Hansen sued under section 63-30-6 for destruction of
improvements to his property during implementation of the
county's flood control program.

The court rejected Hansen's

claim, noting that because Hansen had not alleged that his
property was being held without right, section 63-30-6 did not
apply to his claim.

See Hansen, 794 P.2d at 847.

The corollary

of this holding is that claims such as plaintiff's, involving
possession or ownership of real property, fall within the ambit
of section 63-30-6 and are thereby subject to the notice and
commencement constraints of sections 63-30-12 and -15, as well as
the expanded statute of limitations provided by section 78-12-40.
Plaintiff argues that under Hansen, "several waivers could
apply to the same activity" (Brief of Appellant at 10) . While
defendants agree that multiple waivers may apply to a single set

multiple liability and could spawn multiple litigation among the
partnership, the individual partners, and defendants. This would
be unfair to absent partners, unfair to defendants, and contrary
to judicial economy." Id. at 761. The court held that rules
17(a) and 19(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure "forbid such
a result." Id.
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of facts, they do not agree that the facts of this case bring it
within the scope of section 63-30-5.

Every appellate case

addressing the waiver of immunity under section 63-30-5 has
involved only issues regarding the rights and obligations imposed
by the contract; none has extended the statute's reach to the
contract's underlying validity.3

Moreover, as the supreme court

has recognized, causes of action arising from breach of a
contract term are contractual in nature, while breaches of duty
growing out of a contract are tortious in character.

See DCR

Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433, 435 (Utah 1983) (citing
Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1334 (Cal.
1980).

The DCR court also favorably observed Professor Prosser's

distinction between contract actions, "'created to protect the
interest in having promises performed,'" and tort actions,

3

See/ e.g., Farmers New WorId Life Ins. Co. v. Bountiful
City, 803 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1990) "(discussing City's liability for
flood control under right-of-way agreement for a creek easement);
Dalton v. Salt Lake Suburban Sanitary Dist., 676 P.2d 399 (Utah
1984) (regarding liability arising from sanitary district's
contract to own and operate sewer line); Foster v. Salt Lake
County, 632 P.2d 810 (Utah 1981) (treating County's liability
under program of automobile self-insurance); Baugh v. Logan City,
27 Utah 2d 291, 495 P.2d 814 (1972) (examining City's duties
under an oral contract to convey land)/ Nielson v. Gurley, 888
P.2d 130 (Utah App. 1994)(contemplating plaintiff's claims
allegedly arising out of his lease with the State and his permit
to operate dog-training activities); Brown v. Weis, 871 P.2d 552
(Utah App. 1994) (concerning Stage's liability arising from the
Department of Financial Institutions' breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing implicit in its contracts); Neel v.
State, 854 P.2d 581 (Utah App. 1993) (addressing the State's
liability for breach of contract of which plaintiff was intended
third party beneficiary). Notably, the plaintiffs in all of
these cases are either the contracting parties themselves or
obvious intended third party beneficiaries whose standing to sue
is clear. See n.l, supra.
12

'"created to protect the interest in freedom from various kinds
of harm.

The duties of conduct which give rise to them are

imposed by law, and are based primarily upon social policy, and
not necessarily upon the will or intention of the parties
. . . .'

Prosser, Law of Torts (4th ed. 1971) p. 613." DCR, 663

P.2d 435 (quoting Tameny, 610 P.2d at 1335).

Because plaintiff's

interest lies not in the performance of contract promises, but

m

protection against harm growing from the alleged voidness of the
transaction their performance effected, his claims against the
State defendants sound in tort, not contract, and section 63-30-5
does not apply to them.
Plaintiff has cited no authority to the contrary

He points

only to the complaint's inclusion of the word 'contract" in the
sixth, seventh, and eighth causes of action to establish their
contractual nature

However, none of the challenged causes

contains any claim that the terns of the contract have been
breached

The sixth cause of action (R

25-27) complains only

that the contract was made initially without plaintiff's
knowledge and ultimately without his consent, matters beyond the
scope of the rights and obligations internal to the contract.
The seventh cause of action (R

27-29) seeks to invalidate th,

sale on the ground that the contract was void ab initio--again,
an issue external to the performance of the contract terms

The

eighth cause of action (R. 29-30), the quiet title action
referenced above, is based on the allegation that the contract
and deeds were legally ineffective to transfer ownership of the
13

property, a claim hot within the parties' interest in performance
of the contract promises.

Plaintiff's attempted characterization

of his causes of action as contractual claims simply fails the
supreme court's DCR analysis.
Utah's appellate courts have consistently rejected attempts
by plaintiffs to recharacterize their claims in order to avoid
the defense of governmental immunity.

In Gillman v. Department

of Financial Institutions. 782 P,2d 506, 509 (Utah 1989), the
supreme court refused to treat injuries arising from immunized
licensing decisions as arising from non-immunized negligence.
Likewise, in DeVilliers v. Utah County. 882 P.2d 1161, 1166 (Utah
App. 1994), this Court declined to handle a claim based on
immunized approval of a planned unit development plat as nonimmunized negligent design of an intersection.

Numerous cases

have rebuffed attempts to recharacterize immunized assault and
battery as varieties of non-immunized negligence.4
As the supreme court held in Ledfors v. Emery County School
District. 849 P.2d 1162, 1166 (Utah 1993), " [T]he structure of

4

Rejected non-immune causes of action include negligent
failure to institute safety measures (Taylor v. Qgden City Sch.
Dist. . 927 P.2d 159 (Utah 1996)); negligent failure to apprehend
(Tiede v. State. 915 P.2d 500 (Utah 1996)); negligent
implementation of inmate prerelease and intense supervision
parole programs (Malcolm v. State, 878 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1994));
negligent employment, instruction, and contracting (S.H. v.
State. 865 P.2d 1363 (Utah 1993)); negligent hiring and retention
(Petersen v. Bd. of Educ.. 855 P.2d 241 (Utah 1993)); negligent
diagnosis, treatment, and supervision (Higgins v. Salt Lake
County. 855 P.2d 231 (Utah 1993)); negligent failure to supervise
and protect (Ledfors v. Emery County Sch. Dist.. 849 P.2d 1162
(Utah 1993)); and negligent hiring and supervision (Wright v.
Univ. of Utah. 876 P.2d 380 (Utah App. 1994)).
14

the Utah Governmental Immunity Act . . . focuses on the conduct
or situation out of which the injury arose, not on the theory of
liability crafted by the plaintiff or the type of negligence
alleged."

See also DeVilliers, 882 P.2d at 1166; Wright, 876

P.2d at 383.

The focus of the situation from which plaintiff's

sixth through eighth causes of action arose is not the
performance of contractual rights and obligations, as
contemplated by section 63-30-5(1), but plaintiff's right to
title or possession of real property and a determination of the
State's adverse claim to it, as contemplated by Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-30-6 (1993):
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is
waived for the recovery of any property real or
personal or for the possession thereof or to quiet
title thereto, or to foreclose mortgages or other liens
thereon or to determine any adverse claim thereon, or
secure any adjudication touch:ng any mortgage or other
lien said entity may have or claim on the property
involved.
Because plaintiff has failed io provide any legal support
showing that the immunity act's contract waiver provision applies
to his sixth through eighth causes of action, Utah's liberalized
notice pleading rule cannot assist him (see Brief of Appellant at
12-14) .

In language cited by plaintiff himself (Brief of

Appellant at 13), the supreme court has stated that " [w]hat [the
parties] are entitled to is notice of the issues raised and an
opportunity to meet them.
that is required."
86, 91 (1963).

When this is accomplished, that is all

Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d

Defendants have never contended that the

complaint was insufficient to give them notice of plaintiff's
15

claims; in fact, they have successfully met those claims.

They

have argued only that the court is without subject matter
jurisdiction over the claims because, as claims involving
property, they are untimely.

Defendants' success is no ground

for overcoming plaintiff's failure to identify facts fulfilling
the elements of a contract claim and triggering an exemption from
the statute of limitations under the immunity act.

Notice

pleading may cure inartful language, but it does not convert
tortious acts into contract violations, lengthen statutes of
limitations, or supply missing components of a legal theory.
Plaintiff's brief makes a fleeting reference to Utah R. Civ,
P. 15(b), suggesting that the trial court should have allowed
amendment of the pleadings to conform to the evidence (Brief of
Appellant at 14). However, rule 15(b) permits a motion for
amendment to conform to the evidence to "be made upon motion of
any party at any time."

Plaintiff has cited to no motion of

record making such a request, and scrutiny of the docket reveals
nore.

More importantly, however

plaintiff's ^ule 15(b)

argument, as his notice pleading z rgurue^t, nibses the point:
conforming the pleadings to show t-.ha*" d contract theory was
raised would not alter the fact that it was found without merit.
Plaintiff's claims were dismissed not because his complaint
failed to properly articulate a contract cause of action that was
supported by the facts of record, but because he failed to adduce
the facts that would support it.
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Consequently, the record

provides no basis for conformance of the pleadings to plaintiff's
contract theory.
II. PLAINTIFF HAS NO STATUS AS AN INTENDED THIRD PARTY
BENEFICIARY THAT WOULD PERMIT HIM A SEPARATE RECOVERY
UNDER THE CONTRACT.
Plaintiff mentions in passing that as "an intended third
party beneficiary to the contract, he is brought into the purview
of the contract and Section 63-30-5(1), whether or not he
personally entered into the contract himself" (Brief of Appellant
at 10). Plaintiff identifies no part of the record in which the
issue of third party beneficiary status was raised or ruled upon,
and defendants have been unable to locate any reference to it in
the proceedings below.

Under Utah's appellate precedents, "it is

axiomatic that matters not presented to the trial court may not
be raised for the first time on appeal."

Franklin Fin, v. New

Empire Dev. Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983); see also Ong
Int'l (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455 n.31
(Utah 1993) (rejecting contention that appellate court should
reach "new points raised for the first time on appeal because
they are really new arguments as opposed to new issues.
decline to honor such a distinction.

We

Our concern is whether an

argument was addressed in the first instance to the trial
court"); Salt Lake County v. Carlston, 776 P.2d 653, 655 (Utah
App. 1989) (requiring an issue not "timely

presented to the trial

court in a manner sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon" to be
"deemed waived, precluding this court from considering their
merits on appeal") ; Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors,
17

Inc. , 761 P. 2d 42, 46 (Utah App. 1988) ("rule applies even where
facts are not disputed and issue raised is one of law") ; James v.
Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah App. 1987) (holding that "[i]n
Utah, matters not raised in the pleadings nor put in issue at the
trial may not be raised for the first time on appeal" and stating
that "[a] matter is sufficiently raised if it has been submitted
to the trial court and the trial court has had the opportunity to
make findings of fact or law") , By not raising it in the
district court, plaintiff has waived any argument based on third
party beneficiary status.
Even if it were properly before the Court, plaintiff's third
party beneficiary theory cannot succeed.

In support of this

proposition plaintiff cites to Neel v. State, 854 P.2d 581 (Utah
App. 1993).

Neel is inapposite.

There was no question in Neel

that Neel was an intended third party beneficiary of the State's
self-insurance program (see 854 P,2d at 583); the issue was
whether the State could be sued in contract as an insurer despite
a statutory definition of "insurer" that excluded state entities.
In the case at bar, plaintiff has not adduced facts that would
bring him within the scope of an intended third party
beneficiary.
Under supreme court precedent, " [w]hether a third-party
beneficiary status exists is determined by examining a written
contract."

American Towers Owners Ass'n v. CCI Mechanical, Inc.,

930 P.2d 1182, 1188 (Utah 1996).

The court's test requires that

"'[t]he intent of the contracting parties to confer a separate
18

and distinct benefit must be clear.'"

Id. (quoting Ron Case

Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomcruist, 773 P.2d 1382,
1386 (Utah 1989)) .

Further, "' [a] third party who benefits only

incidentally from the performance of a contract has no right to
recover under that contract.'"

Id. (quoting Broadwater v. Old

Republic Sur., 854 P.2d 527, 537 (Utah 1993)).

Plaintiff's

glancing reference to third party beneficiary status cites no
provision of the written contract that shows the intent of the
partnership and UDOT to confer any benefit on him that is
separate and distinct from the benefit he derives as a partner.
Instead, his benefit, the proportionate share he derived from the
partnership's proceeds of sale, is incidental to his status as a
partner, and he therefore has no right, apart from the
partnership, to recover under the contract.
In order to challenge the court's legal conclusions,
appellant must comply with rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.

Rule 24(a) (9^ requires that " [t]he argument

shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with
respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for
reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with
citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record
relied on."

See also First Sec. Bank of Utah v. Creech, 858 P.2d

958, 962 (Utah 1993) (refusing to reach an inadequately briefed
issue "[ajbsent a compelling reason why we should waive
application of rule 24(a)(9)"); State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439,
450 (Utah 1988) (quoting Williamson v. Qpsahl, 416 N.E.2d 783, 84
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(111. App. 1981) ("'[A] reviewing court is entitled to have the
issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not
simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the
burden of argument and research'")).

Plaintiff's one-sentence

assumption of third party beneficiary status, made without
argument as to the applicable criteria, simply does not meet the
necessary showing under the rule and for this reason, does not
merit the Court's consideration.
III. PUBLIC POLICY DOES NOT SUPPORT CONSIDERATION OF
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS AS CONTRACT ISSUES.
The district court's refusal to use section 63-30-5 to
salvage Bullock's claims is also supported by the logic
underlying contract claims.

As this Court has observed, "a

fundamental purpose of any contract is to define the relationship
of the contracting parties and provide the maximum possible
stability and predictability to that relationship, thereby
minimizing the effect of chance or luck."

Home Sav. and Loan v.

Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 817 P.2d 341, 351 (Utah App. 1991).
This purpose would be disserved by imposing procedural
requirements on the contracting parties that are external to the
contract itself.

In defining the contracting parties'

relationship, contracts generally carry their own notice and

filing

provisions,

making statutory

notice

and

procedural

requirements unnecessary and duplicative or, worse,
contradictory.

Many individuals and businesses may be hesitant

to enter into a contract with a governmental entity if the entity
can breach the contract and then escape liability on grounds of
20

the performing party's failure to follow procedures not a part of
the parties' mutual understanding and negotiated agreement.
However, the reasons supporting section 63-30-5's exemption
from the notice and procedural provisions of the governmental
immunity act also dictate that the statute applies only to claims
involving the determination of the parties' rights and
obligations under a valid contract, and not to claims, such as
those at bar, in which the validity of the underlying contract is
challenged by one who stands as a stranger to it.

The contract

can govern the conduct of only those who are parties to it; its
terms cannot bind non-parties such as plaintiff.

In order to

assure timely processing and progress of claims not governed by
contract, binding procedural provisions for notice of claims and
commencement of suit must be implemented elsewhere.

The

statutory sections from which contract claims are exempted
fulfill this need.

Plaintiff, as a non-party to the contract at

issue, stands in no different position with respect to the State
than any other claimant whose role is not a contractual one, and
he must follow the statutory requisites in order to pursue his
claims.
IV. SECTION 63-30-5 DOES NOT WAIVE IMMUNITY AS TO
INDIVIDUAL STATE EMPLOYEES.
Finally, even if the dismissal of plaintiff's claims against
the State defendants were not subject to affirmance in their
entirety for lack of subject matter jurisdiction below, based on
untimeliness, the district court's decision should nonetheless be
upheld as to Eugene H. Findiay, Craig Zwick, P. K. Mohanty, Dean
21

W. Holbrook, and Alan W. Dearden because these individual State
defendants do not come within the purview of section 63-30-5,
The language of that section specifically states:

"Immunity from

suit of all governmental entities is waived as to any contractual
obligation."
added).
,!

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-5(1) (1993) (emphasis

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(3) (1993) defines

[g] overnmental entity" as "the state and its political

subdivisions as defined in this chapter,"

"Political

subdivision," in turn, is defined as "any county, city, town,
school district, public transit district, redevelopment agency,
special improvement or taxing district, or other governmental
subdivision or public corporation."
(1993).

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(7)

Thus, by the plain language of section 63-30-5, it does

not apply to individual State employees, but only to governmental
entities.
This Court held as much in Nielson v. Gurlev, 888 P.2d 130
(Utah App. 1994).
extend

In the Court's words, "While the statutes that

sovereign immunity include both entities and individual

state employees, section 63-30-5 waives the nouice requirements
and substantive immunity for claims arising irom 'any contractual
obligation' only as concerns 'all governmental entities.'
Section 63-30-5 does not waive the notice requirements for a suit
against a state employee

. . . notwithstanding a nexus between

the claim asserted and 'any contractual obligation.'"
888 P,2d at 135 (citations omitted).
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Nielson,

Thus, the waiver of

immunity applicable to contract claims is not applicable to
plaintiff's complaint against the individual State defendants.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff is neither a party to nor an intended third party
beneficiary of the contract here at issue.

As a stranger to the

contract, he is without standing to sue on actions arising out of
the contractual rights and obligations.

Although he may sue on

the contract's underlying validity, his action resonates in tort,
not in contract; for this reason, he must comply with the notice
and commencement provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act
and the one-year "grace period" for new actions filed after
dismissal of a prior complaint other than on the merits.
not done so.

He has

While contracts generally provide their own notice

and commencement provisions for suit, reflecting the negotiated
agreement of the parties, plaintiff, as an individual, has not
entered into a contract with the State defendants and cannot
avoid the procedural strictures of the controlling statutes for
actions regarding property by recharacterizing his claim as a
contractual one.
Plaintiff did not move below for amendment of the pleadings
to conform to the evidence and cannot now capitalize on that
failure.

Further, because the record does not contain the

necessary evidence to support his contract theory, a motion to
conform the pleadings to the evidence could not have succeeded.
For the same reason, plaintiff's reliance on notice pleading is
23

misplaced:

even if he had clearly articulated a contract claim,

the facts of record do not support it.
For these reasons, as more fully explained above, the State
defendants respectfully request the Court to affirm the district
court's dismissal of all claims against them.

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION
The State defendants do not believe oral argument is
necessary to the proper disposition of this case.

However, they

desire to participate if oral argument is ordered by the Court.
Defendants do believe, however, that a published opinion could be
helpful in defining the distinction between contractually based
claims subject to procedural waivers under the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act and tort claims that must comply with the act's
procedural constraints.

DATED this

\[r^

day of March, 1998.

(

^

LSz

NANCY t. KEMP
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for State Defendants/Appellees
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P.O. Box 140856
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RICHARD B. BULLOCK,
Plaintiff,
:

ORDER GRANTING STATE
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

v.
The State of Utah Dept. of Transportation,
Eugene H. Findlay, Craig Zwick, P. K.
Mohanty, Dean W. Holbrook, Alan W.
Dearden, J. Vance Beatty, Faye B. Beatty,
the estate Reed A. Bullock, deceased, the
personal representative of Reed A. Bullock,
Cleo H. Bullock, Cleo H. Bullock, individually,
and John Does 1-50, inclusive,

:
:
:
:

Case No. 960901457CV

:

Judge Sandra Peuler

Defendants.
The Motion to Dismiss filed by The State of Utah Department of Transportation, Eugene H.
Findlay, Craig Zwick, P.K. Mohanty, Dean W. Holbrook, and Alan W. Deardon (hereinafter

1
it f

f

-r fr r<

v , J *i »i o •:'

collectively "State defendants") came before the court for hearing on January 28,1997 and
February 24,1997. Plaintiff, Richard B. Bullock, was represented by Kevin Olsen. The State
defendants were represented by Martha S. Stonebrook, Assistant Attorney General. The court,
having reviewed the pleadings and having heard the oral arguments of the parties, hereby enters
the following Order:
ORDER
The State defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted in its entirety, and all claims brought
against the State defendants by plaintiff are hereby dismissed with prejudice, as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs Fourth through Eighth Causes of Action are actions regarding real

property and are governed by the provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act, including
U.C.A. § 63-30-6;
a.

Plaintiff failed to bring the Fourth through Eighth Causes of Action against the

State defendants in this court within one year following fhe dismissal of his complaint in federal
court;
b.

Plaintiffs Fourth through Eighth Causes of Action are therefore time barred and

are hereby dismissed with prejudice.
2.

Plaintiffs Ninth and Tenth Causes of Action are for intentional and negligent

infliction of emotional distress, respectively, and plaintiff conceded that these two claims are
governed by the provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act. This court therefore rules that
the Ninth and Tenth Causes of Action are time barred under the Governmental Immunity Act and
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those causes of action are dismissed with prejudice.
It is so ordered this Z- day of April, 1997.
By the court:

Honorable Sandra Peuler
Third District Court Judge
Approved as to form:

Kevin V. Olsen
Attorney for Plaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on the J

day of April, 1997 I caused to be hand delivered

a copy of the foregoing Order Granting the State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (without the
signature of Judge Sandra Peuler) to:
Kevin V. Olsen
Attorney for Plaintiff
320 South 300 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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I hereby certify that on the _/

day of April, 1997,1 caused to be mailed, first

class postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing Order Granting the State Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss (without the signature of Judge Sandra Peuler) to:
Richard L. Bird, Jr.
Attorney for defendants Vance Beatty,
Faye Beatty, and Cleo Bullock
333 E. 4th S.
Salt Lake City UT 84114
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